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HOW DO WE PREDICT ADVERTISING  
ATTENTION AND ENGAGEMENT? 
Dr. Robert Heath 
University of Bath School of Management 
Paper presented at ARF Annual Convention 2007 
 
Abstract 
This paper develops two new definitions for attention and engagement.  Active 
attention is primarily a conscious rational construct, and level of attention is 
therefore defined as the amount of conscious ‘thinking’ going on when an 
advertisement is being processed.  Engagement, however, is predicted to be 
a subconscious emotional construct, and level of engagement is therefore 
defined as the amount of ‘feeling’ going on when an advertisement is being 
processed.  I present evidence to show these two constructs operate 
independently of one another and discuss how research can predict the levels 
of emotional engagement and rational attention that advertisements are likely 
to generate.  Initial results from a research system designed to do this indicate 
marked differences between UK and USA TV advertising, but that that USA 
TV and print ads perform very similarly.  It also shows that use of multimedia 
increases engagement.  
 
Introduction 
In 2005 I published a research study in Journal of Advertising Research which 
showed that advertising with high levels of emotion can be discriminated 
against by recall metrics (Heath & Nairn 2005).  In 2006 I followed this up with 
a research study which investigated the effect on brand favourability of 
rational and emotional content in advertising (Heath, Brandt & Nairn 2006).  
These two studies together call into question the long-held idea that 
advertising works primarily within an information processing paradigm, 
delivering persuasive messages ‘…openly, in the bare and pitiless sunlight’ as 
Rosser Reeves put it (1961:70).  In this paper I assemble learning from 
psychology to try to define what the implications of these findings are for the 
definition of engagement, what exactly is the role of attention, and how these 
two concepts interact with one another.   
Heath Brandt & Nairn (2006) was a two-part research study.  The first part 
tested online a total of 43 currently on-air TV ads (23 in the USA and 20 in the 
UK) for their emotional content and rational content using a research 
technique called the CEP™Test (Cognitive Emotive Power Test).  This test, 
operated by OTX, quantifies two constructs: Cognitive Power™, which 
measures the potency of the message and rational information in the 
advertisement, and Emotive Power™, which measures the potency of the 
emotional content or creativity in the advertisement.   The second part used 
an independent online sample to measure favourability towards each of the 
brands being advertised, using a 10 point scale.  In this test, respondents 
were also shown selected video sections of each of the advertisements to 
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ascertain whether they had seen them before.  The brand favorability scores 
were then split between those who did and did not recognize the 
advertisement, enabling the difference in brand favorability created by 
exposure to the ads to be calculated.   
With these two data sets it was possible to examine the correlation between 
the three different constructs: Emotional Content (Emotive Power™), Rational 
Content (Cognitive Power™) and Shift in Brand Favorability.  Despite 
differences in advertising styles across the two countries, the results were 
consistent.  Emotive Power™ showed a significant linear relationship with the 
shift in favorability, but Cognitive Power™ showed no significant relationship 
at all.  
 The implications from this study are that it is not the rational ‘message’ that 
drives favourability towards brands and makes them strong emotional, but the 
emotional ‘creative’ content.  If this is the case, then it means we have to re-
examine the idea that the main purpose of engagement is to make the 
message in the advertising more effective.  
 
A) Defining Attention and Engagement 
Bob Baroccci’s definition in the ARF Engagement Definitions Document:  
‘Engagement is a prospect’s interaction with a marketing communication in a 
way that can be proven to be predictive of sales effects’ (ARF 2006:4).  If it is 
assumed that brand favourability will predict sales effort, then the results of 
the study described above suggests that it is interaction with the emotional 
content in advertising that best predicts sales effects.  So in this section I am 
going to start by defining two constructs – attention and emotion – and then 
use them to define engagement.   
According to the Longman English Dictionary, the word ‘engage’ means ‘to 
hold the attention of, involve’ (1984: 484).  Despite this apparently clear 
definition, attention appears in only 3 of the 23 definitions in the ARF 
Engagement Definitions Document (ARF 2006), and involvement in only one.  
This is perhaps explained by the presence of a second more emotional 
definition in the Longman Dictionary: ‘to induce to participate’ (op. cit.).   Yet 
emotion is mentioned in only 5 of the definitions.   
It is important to have a clear understanding of what attention is, and what it 
means when we talk about different levels of attention being paid to 
something.  Marketing textbooks tend to use attention in a loose ‘directional’ 
way (Heath & Nairn 2005), similar to William James’ definition at the end of 
the 19th Century: “… the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid 
form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or 
trains of thought” (James 1890: 403).  Attention, however, is not a directional 
on-off process, any more than consciousness itself:  Damasio states ‘…both 
consciousness and attention occur in levels and grades, they are not 
monoliths, and they influence each other in a sort of upward spiral’ (2000: 91). 
It is important therefore to consider not just the direction of attention but the 
level of attention being paid.  In this article, I define the level of attention as 
‘The amount of cognitive resource being deployed’, in line with MacInnis & 
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Jaworski (1989).  In layman’s terms this means the level of attention is the 
amount of ‘Conscious Thinking’ directed at the advertising. 
It is also important to be clear about what is meant by the word ‘emotion’.  The 
Longman Dictionary definition of emotion is ‘strong feeling (e.g. anger, fear, 
joy) usually involving physiological change’ (1984: 478).  This suggests 
emotion is something that is palpable, significant and readily perceivable.  
Using this definition Mast and Zaltman are correct when they say ‘What 
makes emotions specific is cognitive appraisal’ (ARF 2006:19).  But the 
Oxford Dictionary definition of emotion includes ‘love’ (Oxford Compact 
English Dictionary 1996: 321) which may not manifest as a physiological 
response, but may simply be a change in attitude.  Similarly Roseman (1991) 
describes hope, joy, relief, and liking as emotions in his appraisal theory, and 
this opens the door to feelings such as optimism, contentment, appreciation, 
gratitude.   
The definition I have adopted in this paper is to use emotion to signify any 
stimulation of the feelings, at any level.  It follows that emotional content in 
advertising represents anything that is capable of stimulating the feelings of 
the viewer.  This might range from people expressing love, anger, excitement, 
boredom, curiosity, appreciation, amusement, etc., to situations which are 
humorous or poignant or dramatic etc., to visuals that are elegant or beautiful, 
to footage that is beautifully shot with high production values, to background 
music that is just plain nice to listen to.  Note that using this definition, 
emotional content does not have to produce an overt ‘emotional’ response by 
the consumer.  So you don’t have to laugh or cry for something in an 
advertisement to be categorised as emotional content.  This becomes evident 
when you look at the way in which emotion is processed. 
Processing of Emotion 
Lavidge & Steiner (1961) introduced what was probably the first advertising 
model to attempt to address the role of emotion.  Their model advocated three 
components of advertising effectiveness – Cognitive (the realm of thought), 
Affective (the realm of emotions), and Conative (the realm of motives).  They 
described a sequence of six stages – Awareness (cognitive) Î Knowledge 
(cognitive) Î Liking (affective) Î Preference (affective) Î Conviction 
(conative) Î Purchase (conative) – reflecting the thinking of the time, which 
was that cognition had primacy in processing over affect (Schachter & Singer 
1962).  Nowadays the idea of conviction and motivation tends to be replaced 
by attitudes, so in simple terms, ‘conscious thinking’ leads to ‘feeling’ which 
leads to ‘attitude change’ which in due course leads to a purchase decision. 
They were not to know at the time, but they got it seriously wrong.  Feelings 
are much more important and influential than we in the West tend to think they 
are (Gordon 2006), and are processed much more quickly than we think they 
are.  Zajonc was the first to assert this (1980), concluding there were three 
main reasons why feelings must be pre-cognitive:  First, they are unavoidable: 
‘One might be able to control the expression of emotion but not the 
experience of it’ (1980: 156); Second, they operate without the need for words 
and are very hard to verbalise: ‘The communication of affect relies… on non-
verbal channels… Yet it is remarkably efficient’ (1980: 157); Third, they are 
hard to measure: ‘If … preferences were nothing more than cognitive 
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representations …then the problems of predicting attitudes, decisions, 
aesthetic judgements, or first impressions would have been solved long ago.’ 
(1980: 158).   
Zajonc concluded that cognition and affect may depend on separate 
psychological and biological systems.  Le Doux (1998) refined this idea, 
hypothesising that there are two different emotion circuits operating in a state 
of anxiety.  The first of these, described in Eysenck & Keane (2000), is a fast-
acting response which bypasses the ‘cognitive’ cortex, and ‘…allows us to 
respond rapidly in threatening situations’ (2000:493).  The second is a slow-
acting circuit which passes through the cortex, and ‘produces a detailed 
evaluation of the emotional significance of the situation, and allows us to 
respond to situations in the most appropriate fashion’ (2000: 493).   Le Doux 
characterises the two systems by describing the response of someone who 
comes across a snake-like stick on the path in a jungle.  The fast-acting 
response causes the person to jump back and break out into a sweat; the 
slow-acting cognitively-moderated response then identifies the object as a 
stick, and the person relaxes (Le Doux 1998).  Note that both these responses 
might be described as ‘arousal’, but one is instinctive, and the other is driven 
by cognition.  Le Doux’s ideas are widely quoted by practitioners (e.g. Du 
Plessis 2005, Cramphorn 2005) but it should be noted that his model is 
developed specifically to describe anxiety-related responses, something which 
hopefully doesn’t occur much in advertising. Of this, more later. 
Damasio (1994) can be credited with initiating modern thinking about how 
emotions are processed.  He uses the concept of a ‘limbic’ system in the 
brain, a construct develop by MacLean (1952) to represent the original 
mammalian brain, which lies beneath the more recently developed neo-cortex. 
The limbic system, sometimes also called the ‘visceral’ brain, was originally 
responsible for the processing of mammalian instinctive and survival functions 
(e.g. fear, sexual drive, hunger etc.), and it is this system that is now our 
centre of emotional processing.  As it originated as part of the body’s defence 
system, the limbic system operates pre-cognitively and autonomically.  If it 
didn’t, we would have been eaten by predators and have become extinct long 
ago.  More recently he has provided evidence that emotions and feelings are 
formed in what is called the ‘proto-self’ (sic), whereas thoughts are formed in 
what is known as core consciousness (Damasio 2000). He shows that activity 
in the proto-self always precedes activity in core consciousness.  This 
therefore means that emotions and feelings are always formed pre-cognitively 
(2000: 281).   
This concurs with Mast & Zaltman’s view, that ‘The processing that underlies 
(emotional) evaluation is enormously fast and does not require conscious 
effort’ (ARF 2006: 19).  It also agrees with Norm Lehoullier’s view, which is 
that the first level of engagement requires the consumer to be ‘Emotionally 
receptive…’ (ARF 2006: 4).  So this means that Lavidge & Steiner’s model, far 
from being about ‘thinking’ leading to ‘feeling’ which leads to ‘motivation’, 
should really be Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: 
 
Emotion and decision-making 
Lavidge & Steiner predicted that motivation would be the sole influence on 
decision-making.  Psychology has shown this also to be an incorrect 
assumption.  Damasio (1994), referencing cases where rational decision-
making capability is impaired, has shown that emotions and feelings act as a 
gatekeeper to decisions, providing a bridge between the rational activity of the 
neo-cortex and the non-rational (limbic) functions of the sub-cortex.  ‘The 
apparatus of rationality, traditionally presumed to be neocortical, does not 
seem to work without that of biological regulation, traditionally presumed to be 
sub-cortical.’  (1994: 128).  He concluded that cognition is ‘hard-wired’ (sic) via 
the emotions, and that feelings are therefore capable of impeding cognition 
and even driving decisions in the face of negative cognition.  This he uses to 
explain intuitive decision-making, which he believes arises from ‘somatic 
markers’ (sic) – defined as feelings associated with outcomes and embedded 
in semantic memory by past learning.  A negative somatic marker associated 
with a particular outcome acts as a disincentive, but ‘when a positive somatic 
marker is juxtaposed … it becomes a beacon of incentive’ (1994: 174).   
Bagozzi et al (2002) support Damasio’s Somatic Marker theory: ‘We suggest 
that such unconscious processes influence or bias a number of antecedents 
to decision making’ (2002: 98).  And in later work Damasio himself constructs 
a model showing two parallel processing routes – route ‘A’ which is cognitive 
and route B which is ‘affective’.  He predicts that generally both routes will 
activate in parallel, however, ‘On occasion, path B can lead to a decision 
directly, as when gut feeling impels an immediate response’ (Damasio 2003: 
149).   
Damasio’s theory has been validated by Shiv & Fedhorikhin (1999).  They 
gave subjects an unrelated task to perform, and as a reward offered them the 
choice of either chocolate cake or fruit salad.   Half the sample was told they 
had to make their minds up immediately, and the other half was told they 
could decide later on.  It was found that those operating in the constrained 
time situation tended to choose chocolate cake, and those who had no time 
constraint tended to choose fruit salad.  In other words, when time is limited 
(e.g. busy parents shopping for groceries with their children) our choices are 
likely to be driven by our feelings rather than by logic or rationality.   
In circumstances like this the change in attitudes which occurs will not be 
overtly evident.  This concurs with Ehrenberg’s opinion (1974) that attitude 
change need not precede change in behaviour: ‘It seems to be generally 
assumed that … attitude changes must precede the desired change in 
behavior. There is little or no evidence to support these assumptions’ 
(Ehrenberg 1974: 30).  So it is necessary to divide attitude change into overt 
attitude change, where the consumer is aware of and can answer to questions 
about their new attitudes, and covert attitude change, where the attitudes 
which have changed are subconscious and not evident.  This corresponds to 
the idea of explicit learning and implicit learning (Heath 2001, Heath & Nairn 
2005). 
FEELINGS CONSCIOUS THINKING ATTITUDE CHANGE DECISION
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So, reflecting Damasio’s theory, two routes emerge for processing advertising, 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model, however, will fall down, because the covert attitudes have no way 
of being attached to the brand.  Brand linkage demands at least some passive 
learning to be taking place, even if this takes place at low levels of attention.  
So it is necessary to examine in more detail what happens in conscious 
thinking.  
Conscious Thinking 
Level of Attention is defined as the amount of ‘conscious thinking’ going on.  
James defines two boundary levels of attention – active and passive. Active 
Attention is when application is wilful or deliberate, and the process is 
controlled by the individual’s goals.  This corresponds to what is known as 
‘top-down processing’ (Eysenk & Keane 2000: 2), a processing approach 
which is goal-driven. Passive Attention is when the application of attention is 
inadvertent and is controlled by external stimuli.  This corresponds to what is 
known as ‘bottom-up processing’, a processing approach which is stimulus-
driven.  (James op. cit., see also Eysenck & Keane 2000: 119).  So ‘conscious 
thinking’ (i.e. attention) can vary between these two boundary states.  In 
respect of processing and learning from advertising, high attention fully-
conscious thinking is called ‘active learning’, and low attention semi-conscious 
thinking is described as ‘passive’ learning.  Learning which takes place 
without any attention is subconscious, and is termed ‘implicit’ learning 
(Eysenck & Keane 2000: 532).   
Daniel Dennett, in a fascinating book about consciousness, (Dennett 1993) 
questions how much our conscious thinking needs to be involved in decision-
making.  As an example he relates the story of the Grey Walter Precognitive 
Carousel. This was a carousel of slides which was given to patients who had 
an electrode implanted in their motor cortex. The carousel had an apparently 
normal button for them to press to advance the slides, and they were asked to 
do this whenever they wanted to. What they were not told was that the button 
was a dummy and the carousel was wired up to be advanced by the amplified 
signal from their motor cortex.  
If conscious thought is what initiates action, then the patients should have 
noticed nothing. In practice, they complained that the slides appeared to be 
anticipating them and moving forward not just before they pressed the button 
but before they made the decision to press the button. The advance was so 
FEELINGS
CONSCIOUS THINKING OVERT ATTITUDE CHANGE
DECISION
Time-rich
Time-poor
COVERT ATTITUDE CHANGE 
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marked that the patients found themselves expecting the slides to move a 
second time when they pressed the button. 
What this shows is that much of our decision-making happens at a 
subconscious level, and is reported to our conscious brain post-hoc.  That 
wouldn’t be a problem were it not for the fact that Attention operates only in 
our conscious brain, not in our subconscious brain.  This enables us to 
interpret Damasio’s two routes slightly better, as in figure 3: 
Figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All this is really saying is that we have always formed an attitude about a 
decision through emotional and a subconscious rational processing before we 
start to consciously and actively ‘think’ about it, so our conscious thinking 
tends either to support the decision or counter-argue it.  If you bear in mind 
that all this attitude formation happens very fast, then there is good support for 
this model.  Tim Ambler (2000) of London Business School has has 
developed a model on exactly these principals, the Memory-Affect-Cognition 
(MAC) model.  He proposes three levels of behaviour.  At the first level 
consumers operate only on memory, buying in a mindlessly habitual manner.  
At the second level choice is strongly influenced by affect, and conscious 
processing is inhibited.  At the third level cognition is used to rationalise the 
decision, provided that affect is no obstacle, in accord with Damasio (1994).  
And there is empirical evidence to support his model.  His first level ‘mindless 
habitual’ buying behaviour is similar to the ‘thoughtless’ buying behaviour 
which has been observed by Alba (2000).  And his second level idea of 
conscious processing being inhibited corresponds exactly with the ‘blocking’ 
(sic) behaviour found by Van Osselaer & Alba (2000).  They manipulated the 
order of exposure of brand cues and attribute cues, and found that initial 
exposure to (emotive) brand cues caused consumers to test only enough 
additional data to see if it strengthened or weakened the brand association 
with quality.  Once it did then no further updating occurs, and further product 
information cues were ignored.   
Definition of Engagement 
Like Norm Lehoulier, Taddy Hall says that successful engagement begins with 
‘…a conscious or more likely unconscious, emotional response triggered by a 
piece of copy’ (ARF 2006: 3).  But if, as in our model, attitudes can be 
changed without active conscious processing, then the level of Engagement a 
consumer has with advertising is going to be entirely dictated by the amount 
FEELINGS COVERT BRAND-LINKEDATTITUDE CHANGE
DECISION
SUB & SEMI
CONSCIOUS
THINKING
CONSCIOUS THINKING
OVERT ATTITUDE 
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of ‘feeling’ that goes on at the start of the process.  So ‘Level of Engagement’ 
should rightly be defined as ‘the amount of subconscious ‘feeling’ going on’.  
This then operates as an ‘affective’ equivalent to the ‘cognitive’ definition of 
attention defined earlier, being ‘the amount of conscious ‘thinking’ going on’. 
So this yields two definitions, as follows: 
• Level of Engagement:  The amount of subconscious ‘feeling’ going on 
when an advertisement is being processed 
• Level of Attention:  The amount of conscious ‘thinking’ going on when 
an advertisement is being processed. 
The ARF working definition of engagement is ‘Turning on a prospect to a 
brand idea enhanced by the surrounding context’ (ARF 2006: 10).  Defining 
engagement as ‘the amount of feeling going on when an ad is processed’ 
seems to me to precisely reflect the idea of ‘turning on… enhanced by 
surrounding context’.   There is, of course, another important idea also 
enshrined in the ARF working definition, which is that the turning on relates to 
a brand idea, not just to the execution itself.  I will return to this later. 
The value of these two definitions of engagement and attention is that they 
are complimentary and do not overlap.  They measure behaviour towards 
advertising based on different constructs: one conscious and the other 
subconscious, one thinking and the other feeling.  But this, of course, raises 
the important question of how, if at all, these two constructs interact. This is 
examined in the next section. 
 
B) What is the relationship between Attention and Engagement? 
The first person to seriously question the amount of attention being paid to TV 
advertising was Herb Krugman (1965).  Krugman conducted a series of 
experiments with Norman Mackworth in 1968 using eye cameras, noting the 
‘…relatively motionless, focused, or passive eye characteristics of TV viewing’ 
(1977: 8).  He went on to test the brainwaves of a subject watching TV and 
reading a press advertisement (1971), and found that the nature of brain 
waves emitted during TV watching confirmed that this was what he termed 
‘low involvement’ processing when compared to print.   
Krugman’s research took place in a non-distracted environment when 
consumers were being asked simply to look at the ads being shown them.  
What his results suggest that consumers can ‘engage’ with TV ads without 
necessarily needing to use the same amount of conscious thinking that they 
use when reading a newspaper. 
In 2003, working with New International, I decided to test this hypothesis.  
Establishing levels of attention in real life behaviour is especially difficult.  The 
amount of conscious thinking a person is doing at any one moment will be 
vary according to their desire for information and can change with 
extraordinary rapidity (James 1890), and sadly we are not equipped with a 
handy dial on our forehead which tells everyone how much thinking is going 
on.  Similarly, you cannot ask people to monitor how much attention the are 
paying at a particular moment, because it is tantamount to asking them how 
much thinking they are doing.   And if subjects are asked to attempt to monitor 
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their attention levels then their behaviour is invariably affected, and attention 
levels generally increase.  All this means that using simple questions like ‘how 
much attention did you pay to the advertisement?’ or ‘did you think the 
advertisement was good at getting attention?’ produce garbage data.   
Most of the research that has been carried out into attention – generally in the 
field of psychology – has used experimental approaches in which attention 
levels are externally manipulated.  These inevitably result in high levels of 
abstraction from reality. But there is one indicator which betrays how much 
‘conscious thinking’ is going on, and that is the speed of our eye movements. 
Measuring Attention in real time 
The eye sees not by moving smoothly across the field of vision but fixating 
successive points in 'jumps', known as saccades (Huey 1908 / 1968).  During 
moments of fixation the eye can see clearly only a tiny 2° area, equivalent to 
around 6 - 8 letters, although it can recognize objects in a about a 5° area.   
Everything else the eye can see is in what is called the periphery, so if we are 
highly attentive and ‘hungry’ for information, we move our eyes around so we 
can focus on more and collect more information.  Conversely, if we are 
inattentive and feel we don’t need much information we move our eyes around 
more slowly (Rayner & Serano 1994).    
These eye movements are very fast and completely automatic.  As such they 
provide an excellent means of measuring the amount of conscious thinking we 
are doing.  This in turn equates to the level of attention we are paying.  So, as 
the famous German psychologist Kroeber-Riel stated, ‘Eye fixations… serve 
as a behavioural measure of information processing’ (1980: 147).     
These tiny eye movement are barely visible to an observer, but can be 
tracked very accurately by a modern computer-operated eye-camera system. 
Eye cameras, however, only measure visual attention, and in TV advertising 
processing we activate two modes of information processing – visual and 
auditory – so it is possible in real life for the eyes to be looking at something 
and the ears to be distracted and listening to something completely different.  
But the visual and auditory attention systems are ‘supramodally’ linked 
(Schmitt et al 2000: 108) so this problem can be overcome if viewing is free 
from external distraction.  In these circumstances it is likely that cross-
modality will be minimised, and visual attention will be a good measure of the 
overall level of conscious thinking (i.e. attention).   
Using a lightweight head-mounted eye-camera system we at Bath School of 
Management have been able to measure attention towards advertising in a 
near-real media consumption situation.  The motives of the study were 
disguised so that none of the subjects knew that we were interested in 
advertising (it was made out to be a pharmacological trial to investigate the 
effect of TV watching on the eyes).  This prevented artificially increased levels 
of attention being paid towards the advertising.  Half of the subjects were then 
left to get used to the equipment for 10 minutes, during which they were 
offered copies of two current newspapers to read.  Then all subjects were 
shown an episode of Frasier which contained 12 selected ads in three ad 
breaks (one before, one in the middle, one after).  TV ads were rotated to 
prevent order effect. 
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The results, presented at the MRG conference in Madrid in 2004, and recently 
summarised by Heath & Feldwick (2007), suggested that the average 
attention paid towards TV advertising is between one third and one half that 
paid towards newspaper advertising.  In other words, Krugman’s findings were 
right, and TV advertising is indeed low attention compared with press 
advertising.  But what was even more revealing was the nature of processing 
observed.  With newspaper reading the processing was clearly goal-driven.  
Subjects started reading at a deliberately determined point of the paper, and 
scanned pages carefully and systematically.  Ads were sometimes briefly 
fixated, sometimes carefully read, sometimes avoided altogether, but never 
did the eyes wander over the paper aimlessly. 
With TV, processing was completely different.  A few subjects started by 
watching the screen carefully and followed the action, but most watched in a 
‘lazy’ way, exactly matching Krugman’s description of “motionless, passive 
eye characteristics”.  Some looked directly at the screen, but others 
continuously scanned from side to side across it, never looked directly at the 
screen at all,.  Within a few minutes all subjects would look away from the 
screen, and this continued throughout the 30 minute programme, sometimes 
for lengthy periods.  At least one subject fell asleep just before the centre ad 
break, despite it being 11 o’clock in the morning.  When challenged she 
stoutly denied having fallen asleep and claimed she enjoyed the programme.  
She only accepted the accusation when she was shown the ads at the start of 
the centre break and agreed she couldn’t remember any of them.     
What this suggests is that TV and newspaper processing are quite different.  
Newspaper processing appears to conform to the systematic goal-driven ‘top-
down’ processing of the Information Processing Model. But TV processing is 
predominantly automatic, stimulus driven ‘bottom-up’ processing.   
This is frankly no great surprise.  TV is watched primarily as a form of 
relaxation, and as Tellis eloquently points out, consumers ‘... do not yearn for 
ads’ (1998: 121).  Clancey (1992) reveals two thirds of respondents are doing 
some other activity when watching television, and Soley (1994) quotes various 
studies which find between 20% and 40% of people leave the room when the 
advertising breaks are on.  And as long ago as 1989 Gilmore & Secunda 
quoted sources which found that between 70% and 90% of viewers ‘zipped’ 
(i.e. played them through fast forward) ads in previously recorded material.  
But it does suggest that, although the model in Figure 3 may apply to print, for 
a lot of TV advertisements the model is going to look more like the ‘Time Poor’ 
model, as shown in Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4: TV Processing Model 
 
 
 
Measuring Attention and Emotion 
The eye camera is a method of measuring attention.  In addition, it is possible 
to measure emotional content in advertising using the CEP™Test.  This 
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therefore gives the opportunity to examine how emotional content in 
advertising interacts with attention. 
A general assumption amongst practitioners and academics is that emotion is 
a driver of attention.  This theory can be traced back to Berlyne (1964), who 
saw arousal as being critical for learning to take place.  Berlyne’s thinking was 
developed by Kroeber-Riel into an ‘Activation Theory’ (1979, 1984), which 
held that ‘The emotional content of a stimulus induces ‘phasic’ activation (i.e. 
arousal) and activation promotes information processing’ (1984: 152).  Ray & 
Batra (1983) extended this, postulating that emotion increases attention and 
memory: ‘…affective advertising may … be more effective … because it is 
attended to more, processed more, evaluated more favourably, and 
remembered more’(1983: 544).  The idea recurs frequently in both practitioner 
and academic literature (Biel 1990, Doyle 1994).  For example, Du Plessis 
identifies ‘Heath’s Error’ as: ‘All the evidence about ‘emotional appeals in 
advertising’ shows that their main role is to attract attention, therefore it is 
unlikely that, the more emotional an advertisement is, the more it will become 
low involvement processed’ (Du Plessis 2005: 141).  And Page states 
confidently ‘… we pay more attention to emotionally powerful events’ and 
accompanies this with a diagram which shows emotion transforming ‘shallow’ 
low attention to ‘deep’ high attention (Page 2005: 3). 
But all these are assumptions which have never been empirically verified.  In 
order to test their validity we set up a study at Bath School of Management in 
which we manipulated a set of advertisements to have high levels of 
emotional content and low levels of emotional content using a technique 
similar to the CEP™Test.  We then exposed these to respondents in exactly 
the same way as described above.  The results, which will be published in full 
later in 2007, were astonishing.  High levels of emotional content in 
advertising were significantly correlated at 99.9% with LOWER levels of 
attention (Heath & Feldwick 2007).  In other words, the more emotional 
elements there are in an advertisement, the less cognitive resource is used to 
process it, i.e. the LESS attention is paid to it. 
Attention and Liking 
In the same experiment we also measured liking of advertising.  Again, Du 
Plessis is clear about the relationship between liking and attention.  Citing 
studies from the Netherlands and Australia, he states: ‘These studies show 
that there is little doubt ad-liking has an effect on the ability of a commercial to 
get attention…’ (Du Plessis 2005: 147).  But when we measured the level of 
real-time attention paid to our 12 advertisements and correlated it with liking 
we found a similar inverse relationship, statistically significant at 98.8%.  In 
other words, when people like advertising they use less cognitive resource to 
process it, i.e. they pay LESS attention to it.  
Du Plessis’s Error 
Du Plessis’s and Page’s error is to assume that advertising is processed in a 
top-down goal driven manner.  This is, after all, the state in which all market 
research testing takes place.  In these circumstances it might be expected 
that advertising which is liked will be given more attention.  But if advertising is 
processed in a bottom-up stimulus-driven manner, then people will respond to 
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the nature of the stimulus.  Since it have been shown that emotion is 
processed without attention and without the need to use working memory 
(Damasio 2003) then it stands to reason that if, there is a lot of emotional 
content in advertising and not much rational cognitive content, less cognitive 
resource will need to be deployed.  Conversely, if an advertisement has a high 
level of rational cognitive content then viewers operating in a stimulus driven 
mode will deploy more cognitive resource (i.e. more attention) when 
processing it.   
Modern psychologist would not be surprised by this result.  There is evidence 
that attention is primarily a limbic response, deployed especially when we feel 
threatened.  The experiment showed a close but not significant correlation 
between emotional content in the advertisements tested and liking.  If we like 
a piece of advertising we don’t feel so threatened by it, and so there is less 
need to deploy cognitive resource to understand and counter-argue it.  
Conversely, if we don’t like advertising, or if the advertising is devoid of 
emotion, we are likely to feel less comfortable and so pay more attention.   
It should be noted that the experiments tested only advertising with positive 
emotional content.  Advertising with negative emotional content may well 
make people feel more uncomfortable and therefore cause them instinctively 
to pay more attention to counter-argue the negative feeling.  This has been 
predicted elsewhere (Young 2006).   Of course, the downside is that negative 
emotional content processed at low attention will attach negative emotional 
values to a brand, which may well weaken the relationship between the 
consumer and the brand, not strengthen it. 
Relationship between Attention and Engagement 
Level of Engagement is defined as ‘The amount of subconscious ‘feeling’ 
going on when an advertisement is being processed’.  It is reasonable to 
assume that the amount of feeling which goes on when an advertisement is 
processed is dictated by the amount of emotional content in the 
advertisement.  Thus high levels of emotional content will equate to high 
levels of engagement.  
But we know in the experiment carried out that in certain circumstances – TV 
advertising watched in a normal relaxed manner – the level of emotional 
content correlates with lower levels of attention.  What this suggests is not 
necessarily that there is an inverse relationship between levels of engagement 
and levels of attention, but that there is NO direct relationship between levels 
of attention and levels of engagement.  The two are able to operate 
orthogonally.  You can have high engagement and low attention, and low 
engagement and low attention.  Indeed there seems no reason to suppose 
you cannot have high engagement and high attention, and possibly even low 
engagement and high attention.   
The idea that TV viewers can be highly engaged (i.e. experiencing high levels 
of emotional empathy) and at the same time paying little attention (i.e. using 
low levels of cognitive resource) is not so unlikely if you are a fan of classical 
music.  When you listen to music in a concert your feelings are highly 
engaged, but it is not uncommon for your thoughts to be operating at a very 
low level of activity – your mind is ‘blank’, if you like. Thus you have high 
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engagement levels but low attention levels.  And similarly, the idea that 
newspaper readers can be highly engaged and highly attentive is likewise 
easy to understand if you are an avid book reader.  When you are reading a 
book your feelings are highly engaged, and at the same time you are 
consciously deploying large amounts of cognitive resource processing the 
words and sentences, extracting meaning from them, interpreting the 
meaning, and storing it as your own version of the narrative.  So in this case 
you are manifesting high levels of engagement and high levels of attention.  
So the conclusion from this section is that there is no reason why engagement 
and attention should be linked, and there is good evidence to say that, in the 
case of watching TV advertisements, they are not. This explains the findings 
of Heath Brandt & Nairn (2006), that emotional content drives brand 
favourability, not rational content.  If, in real life, people do not deploy much 
cognitive resource when watching TV, then they will generally not be 
effectively processing the messages and other rational information content in 
the advertising.  They may well, however, be engaged, and processing the 
emotional content very effectively.  It is therefore this emotional content which 
exerts the influence on them, and increases favourability towards the 
advertised brand.  This is not implausible: as discussed in Heath Brandt & 
Nairn there is evidence that emotional content is actually processed better 
when less attention is paid (Bornstein 1992). 
 
C) Predicting levels of Attention and Engagement 
I discussed earlier the difficulty of measuring levels of attention, and the fact 
that we are very bad at being able to tell how much ‘thinking’ we are doing at 
any one time.  Measuring the level of ‘feeling’ is an even bigger problem.  
People find it hard enough to describe what they are feeling at any one time 
(Poels & Dewitte 2006):  imagine what would happen if you were to ask then 
to describe how much of this indescribable thing they were experiencing! 
So, using our definition of level of engagement – the amount of subconscious 
‘feeling’ going on when an advertisement is being processed – it is evident 
that level of engagement is going to be best measured using some external 
response mechanism.  Facial expression measurement has been attempted, 
but is nowhere near accurate enough to be used to compare across a range 
of advertisements.  Some success has been achieved with arousal 
measurement techniques such as heart rate, skin temperature, and skin 
conduction monitoring (Poels & Dewitte 2006), but others have challenged the 
idea that arousal is a measure of affective response (Wiles & Cornwell 1990).   
Extensive research continues into this area. 
But one simple way of predicting the likely levels of engagement and attention 
from advertising is to classify the nature of the advertisement.  By measuring 
accurately the relative perceived levels of emotional and rational content in an 
advertisement it should be possible to estimate the relative levels of 
engagement and attention that will be paid to that advertisement.   
The CEP™Test is a system that has been designed to do this.  As mentioned 
earlier, the system quantifies two constructs: Cognitive Power™, which 
measures the potency of the message and rational information in the 
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advertisement, and Emotive Power™, which measures the potency of the 
emotional content or creativity in the advertisement.  It seems likely that these 
two constructs will predict potential levels of emotional engagement with the 
advertising and potential levels of rational attention paid towards the 
advertising.  The system will not on its own predict engagement with the brand 
idea – this requires an additional research phase which can determine how 
well-branded the advertising is – but it will indicate the potential the 
advertising has for achieving engagement and attention. 
Early indications are that this type of approach to research yields important 
results.  Figure 5 shows results for 64 UK TV commercials, these and all other 
CEP™Test results reproduced with the permission of OTX.   
Figure 5 
OTX RESEARCH CEPTMTest 
63 UK TV COMMERCIALS 2006
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It is immediately evident that the levels of emotional and rational content vary 
quite dramatically between ads, as illustrated by the way that ads are spread 
across the axes of the map.  In the UK there appears to be a tendency for TV 
advertising to operate on a spectrum from ‘High Emotional Content + Low 
Message’ to ‘Low Emotional Content + High Message’.  This suggests that, in 
the UK, TV advertising tends to be viewed either with high engagement / low 
attention (top left quartile) or low engagement / high attention (Top right 
quartile), exactly as was found in the experimental eye camera research.  Of 
course, quite a lot of advertising is deficient in the level of both emotional and 
rational content, and so is likely to encourage  disengagement and low 
attention.  These ads appear in the lower left quartile.   
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In the UK very few TV commercials have the potential to encourage both high 
levels of engagement and high levels of attention.  This does not seem to be 
the case in the USA.  Figure 6 shows results from 198 USA TV commercials, 
and the pattern here is that advertising is spread in all four quarters of the 
map.   
Figure 6 
OTX RESEARCH CEPTMTest
198 USA TV Commercials 2005/6
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This suggests that, in the USA, quite a lot of TV advertising is potentially able 
incite both high levels of engagement and high levels of attention, something 
that UK ads are less able to do.  There are TV ads in the US where viewers 
are likely to engage but not likely to pay much attention – advertisements for 
Oreo Cookies and Johnson & Johnson baby Products for example both 
appear in the top left quartile – but they do not reach the extreme levels of 
high engagement + low attention that UK ads do.  And what is also less likely 
to be the case in USA TV advertising is that viewers will pay high attention but 
not be very engaged: this is illustrated by the relatively low number of ads 
appearing in the lower right quartile. 
The relative performance of TV advertising in the USA and UK is shown by 
the means of the ads tested.  In the UK the mean is – 21.6 on Cognitive 
Power™ and + 7.8 on Emotive Power™; in the USA it is + 4.2 on Cognitive 
Power™ and + 12.5 on Emotive Power™.  So USA advertising on average 
has greater potential to achieve engagement and attention than UK 
advertising. 
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But an even more interesting is to look at the performance of non-TV media 
on the CEP™Test map.  The results of tests on print, instore, and web 
advertising are shown in Figure 7.   
Figure 7 
OTX RESEARCH CEPTMTest
165 USA Print / Outdoor / Web  ads 2005/6
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It is at once clear that these media seem to perform almost as well as TV, 
operating in all segments of the map.  The level of dispersion is not as great, 
but the clear message is that these non-TV media are potentially just as 
effective at engaging consumers’ feelings and getting attention as TV.  This is 
reinforced by the mean of the 165 non-TV ads tested:  + 4.7 Cognitive 
Power™ and – 3.6 Emotive Power™.  On a scale of +100 to – 100 this means 
that there is no significant difference at all between TV and non-TV in getting 
attention, and TV is only a little higher in its ability to get engagement.  Indeed, 
remove websites and in-store executions from the graph, and you find print on 
its own differs very little from TV.   
This challenges the long established myth that print and other supposedly 
secondary media are less well equipped to engage consumers than TV.  Print 
is often used as a medium for communicating information, but these finding 
suggest its use as a brand-building media is perhaps something which more 
advertisers should consider.   
One final finding is of particular interest in the area of engagement.  It has 
long been held that multimedia campaigns enhance engagement and 
attention, by providing a variety of exposures to a campaign idea.  The 
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CEP™Test has found one example which illustrates this exceptionally well.  
The campaign in question was creatively very consistent, and was tested in 
finished form in TV, print (two ads), billboard (two ads), and in-store display.  
Results are show below in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 
CEPTMTest Multimedia Ads
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It is clear that in this example the In-store display and the two Billboard ads do 
not appear likely to achieve much attention or engagement on their own, and 
even together they are still relatively poor.  The Print ads do average on 
engagement potential, and TV is likely to be very engaging, although all are 
only average on likelihood of getting attention.  But when TV and In-store are 
put together, the potential for attention goes up.  And when TV and Billboard 
are put together the potential for both engagement and attention go up.  Put 
TV together with Print and the results go even higher.  And the highest 
potential of all for engagement and attention is achieved by combining TV, 
Print, Billboard, and In-store.   
What this suggests is that engagement and attention operate differently for 
individual media than they do for combinations of media.  It is a clarion call for 
media planners to embrace all media, not just TV.  Above all, it is hard 
evidence that, if executions are consistent and reflect the same creative idea, 
then synergy across media really can exist.   
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Conclusion 
In section A) of this paper I developed two definitions for Engagement and 
Attention: 
• Level of Engagement is defined as the amount of subconscious 
‘feeling’ going on when an advertisement is being processed 
• Level of Attention is defined as the amount of conscious ‘thinking’ 
going on when an advertisement is being processed. 
I suggests that this definition of engagement fits very well with the ARF 
working definition of engagement: ‘Turning on a prospect to a brand idea 
enhanced by the surrounding context’ (ARF 2006: 10).  ‘Turning on… 
enhanced by surrounding context’ can only be achieved if the creative 
execution achieves a high level of ‘feeling’ response in the consumer.  Of 
course, that feeling needs to be linked to the brand idea, otherwise it is 
nothing more than a meaningless passing moment of stimulation.   
What is important about these two definitions is that they do not overlap.  
Experimental research reviewed in section B) suggests that engagement and 
attention, as represented by emotional and rational content in advertising, 
operate independently and are not, as most people assume, causally 
connected to one another.  It seems possible to be highly emotionally 
engaged with advertising and yet not be paying much attention, or to be highly 
emotionally engaged and paying a lot of attention.   
Finally, I also suggest that potential for engagement and attention may be 
predicted by measuring the levels of emotional and rational content in 
advertising.  Reviewing the results of one system that claims to do this 
(CEP™Test) confirms that advertising works differently in the USA compared 
with the UK, but works very similarly for TV and non-TV media in the USA.  It 
also suggests that using a combination of different media, all of which reflect 
the same brand idea, will greatly enhance the level of engagement that a 
campaign can achieve. 
If this approach finds favour, there are two next steps.  One is that it is 
important for other research companies follow OTX’s lead and develop similar 
ways of measuring these critically important constructs of emotional and 
rational content.  But the more important step, the burning issue if you like, is 
to establish how effective these different types of advertising are.  Research 
suggests that if advertisers wishes to build strong brands then emotional 
engagement is more important (Heath Brandt & Nairn 2006).  But it is well 
accepted that attention facilitates information processing (Gardener & Parkin 
1990), so if advertisers wish to communicate rational news and information – 
performance claims, price offers, website addresses and the like – and instil 
these into the consumer’s memory, then their advertising has to achieve 
reasonably high levels of attention.  If advertisers need to build a strong brand 
and achieve both good communication, then their advertising needs to 
achieve both engagement and attention.  What is certain is that achieving 
neither means you are in serious danger of wasting your money.   
 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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